

Issue No. 1087, 25 October 2013

Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: Report: Iran may be Month from a Bomb

- 1. Netanyahu: Iran Has Systematically Misled the Int'l Community, Continue the Pressure
- 2. Iran Parliament Chief Warns over Nuclear Pressures
- 3. Iran Sees Nuclear Talks with Powers Finishing within Year
- 4. Deputy FM Calls on US to Avoid Hindering Talks with Iran
- 5. Israel's President Defends Ambiguity on Nuclear Arsenal
- 6. Iran Will Pursue N-P within NPT Framework: MP
- 7. Report: Iran Temporarily Halts 20% Uranium Enrichment
- 8. U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Hope to End Deadlock with Iran
- 9. Report: Iran may be Month from a Bomb
- 10. S. Korea, US Agree to Build Anti-Bioterrorism System
- 11. Experts Observe Development in North Korea's Nuclear Program
- 12. N. Korea Slams Japan's Threat to Strike Missile Bases
- 13. Japan Signs UN Nuclear Disarmament Statement for 1st Time
- 14. N. Korea Could Wage War if Regime Is Threatened: Top S. Korean Commander
- 15. US Expert on Japan Says "Japanese Nukes May Be Possible"
- 16. North Korean Activity Signals Plan for another Rogue Nuclear Weapons Test
- 17. India likely to Acquire Another Nuclear-Powered Submarine from Russia on Lease
- 18. Seminar: Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine Has Failed to Curb Wars, Say Experts
- 19. Russia to Upgrade All Missile Systems by 2021
- 20. Moscow Needs More 'Predictability' in NATO Missile Defense Plans
- 21. Russia's Hypersonic Trump Card Edges Closer to Reality
- 22. Trident Deal Would Be Delayed Until 2016, Says Alex Salmond
- 23. US Adding to Nuclear Weapon Capacity, Despite Obama's Pledges
- 24. Officers Who Hold the Trigger for US Nuclear Forces Caught Leaving the Blast-Doors Open
- 25. Malmstrom Reports 'Highest Possible Grade' in Nuclear Inspection redo
- 26. In Defense of the Nuclear Triad
- 27. Nuclear Arms Wake-Up Call
- 28. Three Reasons the US Should Pay Attention to Israel's Iran Fears
- 29. The Sequester: A New Lever for Reducing the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal?
- 30. Beware Pakistan's Small Nuclear Weapons
- 31. Editorial: Science, Not Semantics, must Drive Nuke Update
- 32. Editorial: U.S. Missile Bases Have Unacceptable Lapses

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Issue No.1087, 25 October 2013

The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.



The Jerusalem Post - Israel

Netanyahu: Iran Has Systematically Misled the Int'l Community, Continue the Pressure

Al-Hayat: West has agreed to low-grade uranium enrichment. By JPOST.COM STAFF 20 October 2013

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu reaffirmed Sunday that the international community should not ease up on pressuring Iran with regard to its nuclear program.

"We must remember that the Iranian regime has systematically misled the international community," the prime minister said at the beginning of his weekly cabinet meeting.

Netanyahu made the remarks a few days after the end of nuclear talks in Geneva between six world powers and Iran.

"Until we see actions, and not just words, the pressure on Iran by the international community must continue. If the pressure on Iran increases, the likelihood that Iran will dismantle its nuclear arms program will also increase," Netanyahu said.

Meanwhile, Iranian sources told London-based newspaper *Al-Hayat* that the West has agreed for Tehran to enrich low-grade uranium.

This report joins a report from *Al Monitor* over the weekend detailing Tehran's offer during the recent nuclear talks in Geneva.

According to *Al Monitor*, Iran has offered to halt the production of near-weapons-grade enriched uranium, vowed to convert its arsenal of fuel rods and pledged to hand over used nuclear fuel for an unfinished heavy water reactor.

The offer supposedly consists of two stages, each to last at least six months, the source, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the secrecy surrounding the Geneva talks, told *Al Monitor*.

Iran, in the first stage of the plan, would reportedly cease production of 20% enriched uranium and "try to convert the stock" so-far amassed to fuel rods for a research reactor.

Other elements of the proposal supposedly include: Iran's willingness to relinquish more information on the Arak heavy water reactor; allowance of full inspection of the Fordow underground enrichment plant; engagement in talks on curbing the scope of production at the Natanz enrichment plant; and Iran's endorsement of the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Despite the various ideas presented, Al-Monitor stated that the plan did not meet various demands made previously by the United States, such as its insistence that Tehran to remove its stock of 20% enriched uranium from the country.

The Middle East news site listed other calls made by the US that the plan did not address, like the complete suspension of activity at Frodow and Arak, and the country's increasing production of low-enriched uranium.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cautioned against putting any stock in reports on the Iranian offer, saying on his Twitter feed that only members of the Iranian negotiating team know the Iranian proposal, and that they are only allowed to speak on the record. Anonymous sources, Zarif said, are only speculating.

http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Netanyahu-Iran-has-systematically-misled-the-intl-community-continue-the-pressure-329208

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

The San Francisco Chronicle



Iran Parliament Chief Warns over Nuclear Pressures

By NASSER KARIMI, Associated Press (AP) Sunday, October 20, 2013

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Iran's parliament speaker warned Sunday that lawmakers could call for stepped-up atomic work if the West presses too hard for concessions in ongoing nuclear negotiations.

The message from Ali Larijani — less than a week after talks resumed — appears aimed at both envoys from the West and Iran's negotiation team, which is led by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. It also highlights the political jockeying inside Iran between backers of moderate-leaning President Hassan Rouhani and hard-liners wary of his outreach to Washington.

Larijani's comments follow appeals by some members of the U.S. Congress to tighten sanctions on Iran despite the nuclear negotiations and historic diplomatic breakthroughs last month, including President Barack Obama's telephone call to Rouhani. Larijani, meanwhile, told Iran's representatives that parliament would not permit world powers to impose "special measures" on the country beyond the obligations laid out by the U.N. treaty overseeing nuclear activity, such as U.N. monitoring and inspection.

Iran's ruling clerics approve all major policies and decisions, but parliament holds enough clout to potentially disrupt talks in response to Western demands to curb the program. Such resistance from Iran's parliament could throw doubts on Rouhani's ability to strike a deal with world powers in the same way that protests in Congress could stand in the way of potentially easing sanctions.

On Sunday, Rouhani told a Cabinet meeting to be careful about foreign enemies' plans for damaging unity in the country, the official IRNA news agency reported. Rouhani said Israel is trying to undermine the ongoing nuclear negotiations.

"Zionists were resorting to sabotage and trouble-making inside or outside the country whenever Iran was achieving a success," Rouhani was quoted as saying.

Details from last week's talks remain tightly guarded, but short-range priorities have been made clear. The U.S. and allies seek to roll back Iran's highest-level uranium enrichment, which is several steps away from weapons grade. Iran wants the West to start withdrawing sanctions, which have hit Iran's vital oil exports.

The next round for talks is scheduled in Geneva for Nov. 7-8 between Iran and a six-nation group, the permanent U.N. Security Council members and Germany. The West and others fear that Iran could eventually produce a nuclear weapon. Iran insists it only seeks reactors for energy and medical use.

The semiofficial Fars news agency quoted Larijani as saying that Iran's nuclear program cannot be pushed beyond the requirements of the U.N.'s nuclear non-proliferation treaty, or NPT, which Iran has signed.

"Iranian negotiators should be fully aware of this," Larijani said. "If parliament feels another powerful party has a double-standard and unjustifiable attitudes, it will approve necessary measures on amount and diversity of nuclear activities."

Larijani did not elaborate, but said there is "no room for trust" yet with the U.S.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran's deputy foreign minister and one of its nuclear negotiators, also told a parliamentary committee that "Iran has not admitted any commitment" in the Geneva talks, the semi-official ISNA news agency reported Sunday. He told state television Saturday that Washington holds a "main part of the responsibility in the confidence-building process" in the talks.

Rouhani told the Swiss ambassador Saturday to "convey the good intentions of Iran to the American side," the website of the presidential office reported. Switzerland represents U.S. diplomatic interests in Iran, whose ties with Washington were severed after the storming of the U.S. Embassy in late 1979.



http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Iran-parliament-chief-warns-over-nuclear-pressures-4910973.php (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Express Tribune – Pakistan

Iran Sees Nuclear Talks with Powers Finishing within Year

Iran believes it can wrap up negotiations with world powers over its disputed nuclear programme in one year or less. By Reuters

October 21, 2013

DUBAI: Iran believes it can wrap up negotiations with world powers over its disputed nuclear programme in one year or less, Iranian media quoted its chief nuclear negotiator as saying.

At talks last week, the first since moderate President Hassan Rouhani's election in June, Tehran offered a three-phased plan; it said could yield a breakthrough in the stand-off after years of diplomatic paralysis and increasing confrontation.

"If we see the same seriousness in future negotiations which we saw in the (Oct. 15-16) Geneva negotiations, we believe that within six months to one year we can conclude the negotiations," Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in an interview with the state-owned, Arabic-language Al Alam television channel.

"Perhaps within three months or six months we can reach a conclusion regarding the first step," he said, in remarks that were published on Monday by ISNA news agency.

The United States and its European allies suspect Iran is working towards a nuclear weapons capability, and have levied sanctions on Iran's energy, banking and shipping sectors that have battered the Iranian economy and caused a currency crisis.

Iran denies it is after nuclear weapons, saying its uranium enrichment programme is purely for peaceful energy purposes.

The six world powers dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue are the five permanent U.N. Security Council members – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France – plus Germany.

Washington described last week's negotiations as the most serious and candid to date, the parties have agreed to meet again in Geneva on Nov. 7-8. Nuclear and sanctions experts from both sides are to meet before the next main round of talks.

All sides have stressed that wide differences must still be overcome to nail down a deal.

"Certainly there are serious differences between us and the other side," Araqchi said, according to ISNA. "We even have deep disagreements with each other. Despite this, we are hopeful we can achieve a common resolution to this dispute."

Araqchi reiterated that Iran would not stop refining uranium, saying domestic enrichment was a right of the Iranian people – but that the extent of enrichment was negotiable.

Iran has so far defied U.N. Security Council demands, that it suspend enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities.

Western officials have said Iran should increase the transparency of its nuclear programme, stop enriching uranium to 20 percent fissile purity – a short technical step away from weapons-ready fuel, reduce its uranium stockpiles and take other steps to assure the world it does not want atomic weapons.

Iran says 20 percent enrichment is meant to provide fuel to run its Tehran medical research reactor, although Western diplomats and analysts say Iran has produced well over the amount it would realistically need for such a purpose.

"This right (enrichment) itself is not up for negotiation," Araqchi said. "Enrichment is part of the end goal ... but its dimensions and amount are negotiable."



Rouhani has sought to end Iran's isolation, partly in order to win an end to sanctions. Araqchi praised the United States for bringing one of the Obama administration's leading sanctions experts to the Geneva talks.

"The presence of this individual during the negotiations and the explanations they gave showed that the Americans at least are ready to show they are serious," Araqchi said.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/620417/iran-sees-nuclear-talks-with-powers-finishing-within-year/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

FARS News Agency – Iran Monday, October 21, 2013

Deputy FM Calls on US to Avoid Hindering Talks with Iran

TEHRAN (FNA) - Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araqchi once again rejected any negotiation on Tehran's right of enrichment, and asked the US not to put hurdles on the path of the Iran-powers talks.

"Our position is completely clear on the enrichment issue; enrichment is the Iranian people's right and therefore this right is not negotiable and we will never negotiate over enrichment itself," Araqchi said in an interview with the Iranbased Arabic-language al-Alam news channel on Monday.

"The dimensions, range, size and details of enrichment can be an issue for negotiations and as we have said, we are ready to pay attention to and remove the concerns, and not the excuses, of the other side," he added.

Asked about the Zionist media's claims about the details of the recent talks between Iran and the world powers in Geneva, which the two sides decided to keep confidential, Araqchi said, "They (Israel and the US) are no doubt partners and on the same front, but these are the Americans themselves who should prevent the destruction of the atmosphere of the negotiations."

He, meantime, said that the other side has not revealed the details of the negotiations yet and the reports released about them are all media speculations.

Araqchi who is also a senior member of the country's team of nuclear negotiators said earlier this month that Tehran is ready to negotiate over the form, amount and level of its uranium enrichment during the upcoming talks with the world powers, but taking the country's enriched uranium stockpile abroad is no way acceptable.

"We, of course, will negotiate on the different forms, amounts and levels of enrichment, but sending the (nuclear) materials out of the country is our redline," Seyed Abbas Araqchi said in a televised interview with Iran's state-run TV last Sunday.

He underlined that Iran's enrichment right and protecting the Iranian nation's rights are the other redlines in negotiations with the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, France, Britain and China plus Germany), and said, "We will not retreat even an iota from whatever the Iranian nation is entitled to have based on the international treaties."

Araqchi underlined that Iran "will obviate all the rational concerns of the opposite side to the talks", and added, "These negotiations are on the nuclear issue, but if they show interest, we will also be ready for talks on the regional issues and other international challenges."

His remarks came after certain western media and officials raised a proposal saying that Iran will agree with transferring its 20-percent-enriched uranium supplies to reach an agreement with the West over its nuclear program.

The United States and its Western allies have been demanding that Iran cease enriching uranium to 20 percent grade.

Tehran has refused to scuttle its enrichment activities, citing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows nations to process uranium for civilian uses like energy production and medical research.



Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi said Iran had recently reduced its 240-kilogram stock of 20 percent uranium to 140 kilograms, a 42 percent drop, by converting it to fuel rods for Tehran's medical research reactor. He also said the rest of the stockpile was being converted as well.

Fordo enrichment facility hosts Iran's uranium enrichment to the purity level of 20 percent which is needed for fueling a research reactor in Tehran which produces radioisotopes for medical purposes.

The western media claimed recently that Iran's new president Hassan Rouhani is willing to shut down its nuclear facility if the West agrees to lift Islamic republic's sanctions.

Salehi strongly rejected western media reports claiming that Tehran has raised a proposal to the West to close its Fordo uranium enrichment facility near the Central city of Qom for lifting sanctions against the country.

"The closure of Fordo site is a sheer lie," Salehi told reporters at the end of a cabinet meeting in Tehran in September.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920729000739

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Al Bawaba – Amman, Jordan

Israel's President Defends Ambiguity on Nuclear Arsenal

Via SyndiGate.info October 22nd, 2013

President Shimon Peres, notorious for his work with Israel's nuclear program, commented on his Israel's position regarding Iran's nuclear program Monday.

Peres claimed that Iran's President Hassan Rouhani reflects what Israel considers a "chance" in comparison to Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's concerns that the Iran's leader is a "wolf in sheep's clothing".

In an interview with France 24, Peres told the television network, "It's a chance, undecided yet. Apparently there are differences within Iran (over its nuclear program); who is going to win I don't know."

Since Israel has never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is no way to tell exactly how many nuclear warheads they have but experts believe Israel has at least 100 nuclear warheads.

Peres' response about the ambiguity on their nuclear program was that it acted as a deterrent.

"It depends why you want nuclear weapons. For me a nuclear option was an instrument to lead to peace, not to attack," said the Israeli president.

"It was a deterrence that had nothing to do with reality whether we have it or not.

"Fantasy plays an extremely great role to increase the deterrence, so it is ambiguous, yes. Why should I clarify?"

In what is becoming a traditional position, Israeli governments have said for over 40 years that their country would not introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East first. In something of a "don't ask, don't tell" agreement made with the US in 1969, Israel has continued to refrain from publicly discussing its nuclear capabilities while the US does not push the country for disclosure even though the issue is brought up by UN members often.

http://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-iran-nuclear-peres-netanyahu-housani-528169

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Press TV – Iran

Iran Will Pursue N-P within NPT Framework: MP

Wednesday, October 23, 2013



A senior Iranian lawmaker says the Islamic Republic will continue its nuclear energy program within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection.

"Iran believes that the existence of even one nuclear bomb poses a serious threat to the global security and peace," Chairman of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Alaeddin Boroujerdi said in a meeting with French senators Joelle Garriaud-Maylam and Jean-Yves Leconte in Tehran on Wednesday.

Boroujerdi also described the presence Israel's clandestine nuclear weapons stockpile as an example of the Western powers' double standard vis-à-vis the campaign against weapons of mass destruction.

"The recognition of the Islamic Republic of Iran's right to acquire peaceful nuclear energy forms the basis for any agreement with the P5+1," the Iranian lawmaker stated.

The US, Israel, and some of their allies have repeatedly accused Iran of pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.

Iran rejects the allegations, arguing that as a committed signatory to the NPT and a member of the IAEA, it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In addition, the IAEA has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran's civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production.

Boroujerdi stated that Iran hails the Syrian government's cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and United Nations on the elimination of its chemical weapons as a courageous move, and maintains that the Israeli regime must also destroy its undeclared nuclear arsenal.

The Israeli regime is widely believed to be the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The regime reportedly maintains between 200 and 400 atomic warheads, but under its policy of so-called nuclear ambiguity, it has never denied nor confirmed its possession of the weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, Tel Aviv has never allowed any inspection of its nuclear facilities and continues to defy international calls to join the NPT.

Boroujerdi also stressed Iran's principled policy in the establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East, noting that security and peace in the Persian Gulf can only be ensured through cooperation and collective efforts of all regional states.

Garriaud-Maylam, for her part, expressed the French Senate's readiness to expand parliamentary ties with Iran's Majlis.

She said that French and Iranian parliaments can facilitate further enhancement of all-out relations between Paris and Tehran.

Leconte also hailed Iran's significant and influential role in the Middle East, noting that the Islamic Republic greatly contributes to the regional security as a mighty and stable country.

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/10/23/330967/iran-to-pursue-nprogram-within-npt/(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Al Arabiya - U.A.E.

Report: Iran Temporarily Halts 20% Uranium Enrichment

Thursday, 24 October 2013 Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Tehran -- Iran has temporarily halted its production of enriched uranium to 20 percent purity as it has sufficient stocks to fuel its Tehran research reactor, a lawmaker was quoted Thursday as saying.



"There is no production at all ... as right now there is no need for the production of 20 percent (enriched) uranium," the parliament website reported conservative MP Hossein Naqavi Hosseini as saying.

Iran's nuclear enrichment program is at the core of its dispute with world powers, who suspect it masks a drive for atomic weapons despite repeated denials by the Islamic republic.

Enriching uranium to 20 percent purity is a few technical steps short of producing weapons-grade fissile material.

There was no immediate comment on the report from the government, from Iran's atomic organization, nor from the nuclear team tasked with negotiating with world powers over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

The parliamentary website, ICANA.ir, further quoted Naqavi Hosseini as saying the fuel for the Tehran reactor, which is used to produce medical isotopes, is fully stocked.

"This site currently has the required fuel and there is no need to produce (the 20 percent)," said Nagavi Hosseini.

"Tehran itself decides whether to have above five percent enrichment or not. But the issue of suspension and halt is at the moment meaningless as there is no production at all," he said, referring to Western demands that Tehran suspends the high-level enrichment.

Naqavi Hosseini is spokesman for the foreign policy commission, which is regularly briefed on Iran's nuclear work.

Declarations by members of the commission have on occasions been denied by the government.

All decisions on Iran's nuclear program rest with the ultimate decision-maker, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran insists it will not bow to pressure to end its enrichment program despite repeated demands by the U.N. Security Council and several rounds of sanctions.

Demands that the program be halted were again put forward earlier this year in the Kazakh city of Almaty, in talks between Iran and the P5+1 group -- the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany.

The halting of the sensitive work could be crucial in resolving the long-running showdown in the negotiations, which were revived last week in Geneva and are set to resume in November.

In the talks, Iran is seeking the lifting of international sanctions which have damaged its struggling economy. World powers for their part are seeking to ensure that Tehran is not able to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear enrichment activities are monitored by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/24/-Report-Iran-temporarily-halts-20-uranium-enrichment.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Egypt Independent - Cairo, Egypt

U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Hope to End Deadlock with Iran

Thursday, October 24, 2013 By Reuters

Iran's apparent new readiness to address international concerns about its atomic ambitions will be tested in talks with UN inspectors on Monday, with diplomats hoping for progress such as on access to a sensitive military site.

However, the diplomats say Iran will probably agree to cooperate fully with an investigation by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only if a broader deal is reached in separate negotiations with six world powers.



New President Hassan Rouhani has raised hopes of an end to international deadlock over the nuclear programme by promising to engage with the West, in return for an easing of sanctions that are damaging the Iranian economy.

The Vienna-based IAEA has been investigating accusations for several years that Iran may have coordinated efforts to process uranium, test explosives and revamp a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhead.

Iran says such claims are baseless and forged, and a series of meetings in Vienna between Tehran officials and the IAEA inspectors since early 2012 have been fruitless.

Expectations for Monday's round are higher and the diplomats believe Iran may soon offer some concessions, perhaps by allowing the inspectors to visit its Parchin military base southeast of Tehran - long a priority for the IAEA.

"I think both sides are looking to see whether they can be a bit more creative," one Western envoy said. Another diplomat said Iran would need to come up with "something positive".

The IAEA believes nuclear-related explosives tests took place at Parchin, possibly a decade ago, and wants the inspectors to interview officials and study documents to shed light on what happened there.

It has acknowledged, however, that it may no longer unearth anything at Parchin due to suspected Iranian efforts to remove any incriminating nuclear-linked traces there.

Tehran denies the accusations and says it will allow visits to Parchin once the two sides have reached an agreement on how the investigation should be carried out.

Any overall deal with the IAEA is likely to depend on progress at the separate talks in Geneva between Iran and the six powers - the United States, France, Britain, Germany, China and Russia, which want Tehran to curb nuclear work that can have both civilian and military uses.

These negotiations resumed on a hopeful note last week and a further round is due on November 7-8. An Iranian parliamentarian was quoted as saying Iran had halted its higher-grade uranium enrichment, but diplomats in Vienna said they were unaware of any such move. The IAEA declined comment.

ELEVEN UNSUCCESSFUL MEETINGS

The IAEA - tasked with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world - wants access to sites, officials and documents for its stalled investigation into alleged past experiments and research that could help Iran assemble atomic bombs, if it decided to pursue such arms of mass destruction.

Eleven meetings between senior IAEA and Iranian officials since January last year have so far failed to produce a framework accord outlining the terms for the investigation.

But diplomats briefed on the closed-door discussions said Iran seemed more willing to tackle issues of substance in the last meeting, held in late September.

Western experts say Iran must address the IAEA's concerns if it is to build confidence in the outside world that any activity it might have undertaken in the past to acquire a capability to produce nuclear weapons has since ended.

"Iran knows that in order to pave a way to a comprehensive solution those questions need to be answered," said former IAEA chief inspector Olli Heinonen, now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Iran says its nuclear programme is for peaceful electricity generation and that it will never develop atomic arms.

Tehran could make sanctions relief more likely if it would "immediately cooperate with the IAEA on inspections of key sites, including Parchin, and to ensure that past weapons-related experiments have been discontinued", the Arms Control Association, a US research and advocacy group, said.

http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/un-nuclear-inspectors-hope-end-deadlock-iran

(Return to Articles and Documents List)



USA TODAY

Report: Iran may be Month from a Bomb

Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium to build a nuclear bomb in as little as a month, according to a new estimate by one of the USA's top nuclear experts

By Oren Dorell, USA TODAY

October 25, 2013

Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium to build a nuclear bomb in as little as a month, according to a new estimate by one of the USA's top nuclear experts.

The new assessment comes as the White House invited Senate staffers to a briefing on negotiations with Iran as it is trying to persuade Congress not to go ahead with a bill to stiffen sanctions against Iran.

"Shortening breakout times have implications for any negotiation with Iran," stated the report by the Institute for Science and International Security. "An essential finding is that they are currently too short and shortening further."

David Albright, president of the institute and a former inspector for the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, said the estimate means that Iran would have to eliminate more than half of its 19,000 centrifuges to extend the time it would take to build a bomb to six months.

The Obama administration has said Iran is probably a year away from having enough enriched uranium to make a bomb.

Bernadette Meehan, an NSC spokeswoman for President Obama's National Security Council, said the intelligence community maintains "a number of assessments" regarding potential time frames for Iran to produce enough weaponsgrade uranium for one weapon or a testable nuclear device.

"We continue to closely monitor the Iranian nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium," Meehan said.

World powers are seeking an agreement "that ultimately resolves all of the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program," she said. "The ultimate goal is a comprehensive agreement that is credible, transparent, and verifiable."

In the report, Albright said negotiations with Iran should focus on so-called "breakout" times, or the time required to convert low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade.

Albright, who has testified before Congress, said the negotiators should try to find ways to lengthen the breakout times and shorten the time that inspectors could detect breakout. ISIS' analysis is based on the latest Iranian and United Nations reports on Iran's centrifuge equipment for producing nuclear fuel and its nuclear fuel stockpiles.

Iran's stockpile of highly-enriched uranium has nearly doubled in a year's time and its number of centrifuges has expanded from 12,000 in 2012 to 19,000 today.

Sen. Mark Kirk, an Illinois Republican whose Senate Banking Committee is considering legislation to tighten Iran sanctions, said the report shows that Iran is expanding its nuclear capabilities under the cover of negotiations.

"The Senate should move forward immediately with a new round of sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring an undetectable breakout capability," he said.

The White House has said new sanctions legislation should wait while current negotiations — scheduled to resume officially in Geneva next month — are moving forward.

The White House said Thursday it will continue consulting with Congress "so that any congressional action is aligned with our negotiating strategy as we move forward," said Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for President Obama's National Security Council.



Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has said his country has no interest in nuclear weapons but that producing nuclear fuel is Iran's right. His foreign minister, Javad Zarif, has said Iran will not ship its nuclear stockpile to a third country.

However, Iran has blocked international inspectors from some suspected nuclear facilities to verify they are being used for peaceful purposes, access required under international agreements it has signed.

United Nations inspectors have found evidence of a weapons program in violation of Iran's commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The USA and the U.N. Security Council have implemented crippling economic sanctions on Iran to sway it to take steps to assure the world it is not developing a bomb.

Israel, which sees an Iranian nuclear bomb as a threat to its very existence, has said it will take military action to prevent Iran from getting a bomb.

ISIS estimated in October 2012 that Iran could produce enough highly-enriched uranium for a bomb within two to four months. The new estimate is based on an analysis of the latest reports by Iran and the the IAEA.

ISIS considered various scenarios, including if Iran decided to build a covert enrichment plant like it has under a mountain in Fordow, near the city of Qom, that was designed for optimal efficiency and minimal time to enrich enough uranium for bomb making. Such a facility built with current Iranian technology could produce enough material for a bomb in a week, according to the ISIS report.

"If they did that and they were caught it would be a smoking gun of a nuclear weapons program," Albright said.

If Iran moves ahead with installation of its more efficient, second generation centrifuges, it would be able to produce enough nuclear fuel for a bomb with so few of them, between 2,000 and 3,300 centrifuges, that they could fit in a small warehouse, Albright said.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/24/iran-bomb-one-month-away/3181373/
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

S. Korea, US Agree to Build Anti-Bioterrorism System

October 20, 2013

SEOUL, Oct. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have agreed to build a government-level integrated response system to better prepare for biological outbreaks and bioterrorism threats, a Seoul's defense ministry official said Sunday.

The surveillance system will allow the two countries to monitor and counter some 10 biological threats such as anthrax and smallpox, and potential biological weapons, the ministry official said.

"There was a joint awareness between the two nations to build a system to better counter various biochemical accidents and terror attacks amid frequent domestic and international threats," said the official.

Lee Nam-woo, who is in charge of the South Korean defense ministry's welfare department, signed the agreement with Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense Carmen Spencer in Washington, D.C. on Friday, the official said.

The system will greatly enhance Seoul's defense technology against chemical and biological weapons, the official said, adding that the system will enable the two nations to share various information on vaccines and diseases as well.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/10/20/43/0301000000AEN20131020001100315F.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Hankyoreh – South Korea



Experts Observe Development in North Korea's Nuclear Program

With development, possibility of North Korea giving up its nuclear program becoming less likely By Park Hyun, Washington correspondent October 21, 2013

Leading North Korea experts in the US are warning that the country's nuclear capabilities are becoming more sophisticated, and it is looking less likely that Pyongyang will give up its nuclear program.

Siegfried Hecker, a renowned nuclear researcher at Stanford University, wrote in an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that North Korea was likely to "operate the restarted 5-megawatt reactor [at Yongbyon] for two years with a full load of 8,000 fuel rods, cool this spent fuel and extract roughly 10 to 12 kilograms of plutonium within three years."

According to Hecker, this means North Korea would be able to produce roughly one nuclear weapon per year.

"Such a production rate does not constitute a game changer, but it would give North Korea more plutonium to test in order to refine its nuclear devices to fit on its missiles," he wrote.

Hecker also said North Korea could repurpose its experimental light water reactor (ELWR) from electricity production to produce 10 to 15 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium a year.

"A more troublesome alternative . . . would be if Pyongyang built a copy of the 50-megawatt reactor that was near completion in 1994, but then abandoned because of the Agreed Framework [in 1994]," he wrote.

He added that this project would "take at least five years to complete."

"The 10 bombs' worth of plutonium this reactor could produce would be a game changer," he warned.

Noting that North Korea was "moving ahead on all nuclear fronts," Hecker observed, "Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula must remain the goal, but it is a more distant one following these new developments."

"It will now be more challenging and costly, although not impossible, to get North Korea to agree to what I have called 'the three no's' -- no more bombs (meaning no more plutonium and HEU); no better bombs (no nuclear testing and no missile launches); and no exports," he continued.

Meanwhile, former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Evans Revere wrote in a report published by the Brookings Institute on Oct. 19 that many proponents of dialogue with Pyongyang have concluded that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear or missile programs.

"China hopes to reconvene the Six-Party denuclearization talks that collapsed in 2008. Experience tells us that such negotiations, if they were to resume, will not end Pyongyang's determined pursuit of nuclear weapons," he wrote.

Revere said the US should step up its sanctions to make Pyongyang realize that a nuclear program would rule out economic development and increase instability.

At the same time, he also said Washington should leave the door open for sincere dialogue to achieve denuclearization.

"We should also recognize that only direct dialogue with North Korea's leaders has any chance of changing DPRK policy," he wrote.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/607875.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Post - Boston, MA

N. Korea Slams Japan's Threat to Strike Missile Bases

Yonhap News Agency October 21, 2013



SEOUL, Oct. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korea blasted Japan's defense minister Monday for threatening to attack its missile bases, claiming such comments reveal Tokyo's plot to become a military power.

The denunciation carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) followed a statement by Itsunori Onodera that hinted at taking tough military action at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee held in Tokyo on Oct. 3.

The North's official news wire service said the minister hinted at considering a strike against missile bases during talks with his U.S. counterpart earlier this month.

"The ludicrous statement made by Onodera showcases Tokyo's dark plan to take advantage of the anti-North Korean policy espoused by Washington to become a military power," the media outlet said.

The KCNA also said that Japan is using Washington's so-called pivot toward the Asia-Pacific and exaggerating North Korea's missile and nuclear threat to lay the legal and material foundation to become a militarist country.

Pyongyang, like many Asian countries, is wary of any attempts by Japan to build up its arms since the island nation invaded large parts of Asia before and during World War II. The Korean Peninsula was a colony of Japan for 36 years in the first half of the 20th century.

The KCNA, meanwhile, claimed it is becoming apparent that Japan is poised to start another Asian war and that every effort must be made to thwart such a plan.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131021/n-korea-slams-japans-threat-strike-missile-bases

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

People's Daily Online - China

Japan Signs UN Nuclear Disarmament Statement for 1st Time

(Xinhua)

October 22, 2013

TOKYO, Oct. 22 -- Japan for the first time has thrown its weight behind a UN statement on nuclear disarmament with senior government officials stating Tuesday that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use are unacceptable.

The statement was originally proposed by New Zealand and signed by Japan on Monday at the General Assembly's First Committee on disarmament.

The statement denounced the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and says that the very survival of humanity decrees that nuclear weapons must, without exception, never be used.

Japan's Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said Tuesday that the government fully supports the statement as Japan is the only country to have experienced the atrocities caused by a nuclear attack.

"Japan understands firsthand the sheer horror of nuclear weapons and the survival of future generations is dependent on the irradiation of such weapons," Kishida told a press conference, referring to the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki toward the end of World War II.

Kishida's welcoming of the statement, similar statements of which up until now Japan has not signed, was in line with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's stance on the issue, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga telling a news conference that the prime minister ardently believes in the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Japan's failure to sign such pacts in the past, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty proposed in April, was due to the government believing that previous statements ran contrary to Japan's security policy.



Japan's reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrence was previously deemed to be at odds with prior non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament treaties, but following the Japanese government lobbying the assembly to reword the joint statement, officials here said that it is now acceptable to Japan and devoid of any contradictions.

The wording of the statement, according to government officials here, now takes into account countries looking to swiftly eradicate nuclear weapons entirely as well as countries looking to phase out such weapons over a period of time.

Japan's central government has been under pressure from the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to sign the latest statement, with Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui saying Tuesday he also welcomed the move.

Matsui said the central government finally shares the sentiments of the city's hopes for a nuclear-free world.

Similarly, Nagasaki Mayor Tomihisa Taue said the move was a positive step towards eradicating nuclear weapons and offers an opportunity for the Japanese government to be involved in a new united international security structure.

Taue also urged the central government here to take the lead in guiding other countries who have also endorsed the statement to ensure its realization.

August marked the 68th anniversary of the bombings of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities, which took the lives of as many as 166,000 people in Hiroshima and 80,000 people in Nagasaki, with half of the deaths in each city occurring on the first day the United States dropped the bombs.

Thousands more died from radiation sickness, burns and other injuries sustained by the atomic attack in the weeks, months and years that followed, according to official records.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8433233.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News Agency - South Korea

N. Korea Could Wage War if Regime Is Threatened: Top S. Korean Commander

October 22, 2013 By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Oct. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top military commander said Tuesday North Korea could wage war if its regime is threatened or if it misjudges the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Navy Adm. Choi Yun-hee, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), warned of the possibility that the North could make a bad decision when asked by lawmakers under what condition a war could occur on the peninsula.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un could opt for war if his regime is threatened, the balance of military power changes between the two Koreas or alliance between Seoul and Washington is weakened, Choi said.

"Considering the recent situation, the North Korean regime is different from the one during the Korean War," the former Navy chief said during the first parliamentary audit since taking the top commander post last week.

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950 after the communist North invaded South Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula divided along the 38th parallel.

According to several documents, then North Korean leader Kim II-sung, the current ruler's grandfather, went ahead with a full-out war after both China and Russia approved his decision and promised to send reinforcements if needed.

When asked how to handle the young leader who vowed to reunify the two Koreas by force in the next three years, Choi pledged to maintain high military readiness to deter North Korean threat.



"Besides the rhetorical threats, the North Korean military has continuously sought to enhance capabilities through drills," Choi said. "We will use all forces to deter (provocations), mobilizing U.S. forces if needed."

Kim said the North sent propaganda leaflets through the border nine times this month alone, which were collected by South Korean soldiers at the front-line units.

He also said North Korean patrol ships crossed the western maritime border, called the Northern Limit Line (NLL), nine times in October, while fishing boats occasionally operated south of the line.

Choi also pledged to beef up South Korean forces' deterrence capabilities as Pyongyang has made progress in its weapons program by firing off a long-range rocket last December and conducting a third nuclear test in February.

Military analysts believe the latest move is aimed at developing technology to miniaturize a nuclear warhead small enough to be launched on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The two Koreas still technically remain at war as the three-year conflict ended in a cease-fire and no permanent peace treaty was signed by the combatants.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/10/22/43/0301000000AEN20131022011151315F.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Business Korea – Korea

US Expert on Japan Says "Japanese Nukes May Be Possible"

24 October 2013

An American expert on Japan said that Japan could pursue nukes using North Korea and China as a pretext.

"Most of the Japanese people are still against having nuclear weapons. However, due to recent developments in the domestic and international arena, they might rethink the issue," said Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science, director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, and Japan expert at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), in an October 22 report.

The professor cited North Korea and China as Japan's external security threats that might stoke the atmosphere of crisis in Japan and therefore the country's nuke development. He commented, "Japan's biggest concern is North Korea. If the North Korean regime collapses or is attacked by outside forces, it is possible that Pyongyang will launch a nuclear attack on Tokyo with the nothing-to-lose mentality. On top of that, it's doubtful whether the North can control its own nuclear arsenal."

The MIT professor also said that if China, which has dramatically increased its defense budget in recent years, accelerates the development of nuclear weapons, the US nuclear umbrella will shrink. He said that in that case, Japan will reconsider nuclear armament.

However, he pointed out that owing to the concentration of its population in capital cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, the country will suffer tremendously if attacked. Therefore, Japan's efficiency of retaliation using nukes appears to be low. Furthermore, diplomatic costs for nuke development will be high.

The expert at NBR added that if Tokyo pursues nuclear arms, S. Korea will follow suit. As a result, the nuclear arms race may begin in the region, and the US-Japan alliance can be damaged as well.

He concluded by saying, "Given the uncertainty of the security environment in Northeast Asia, including an unpredictable N. Korea, Tokyo can change its course some day. Currently, there are few Japanese or American people who openly support Japan's development of nuclear capabilities, but we should consider the possibility of its nuke development."



http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/article/2027/japanese-nuclear-armament-us-expert-japan-says-%E2%80%9Cjapanese-nukes-may-be-possible%E2%80%9D

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Washington Times

North Korean Activity Signals Plan for another Rogue Nuclear Weapons Test

By Ashish Kumar Sen, *The Washington Times* Thursday, October 24, 2013

Increased activity at North Korea's main underground nuclear test site suggests that the rogue communist nation is preparing to conduct another illegal atomic weapons blast, according to a report by a Washington-based research institute.

Satellite photographs of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in northeastern North Korea show two new tunnel entrances and ongoing excavations, including where tests were conducted in 2009 and in February in violation of U.N. resolutions, says the report by the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

The new entrances and growing piles of dirt, detected via an analysis of satellite photographs taken between mid-May and Sept. 27, suggest that North Korea may be digging tunnels for nuclear tests or building an entrance to an existing tunnel, the report says. It also notes that construction and renovation work are taking place at the main support area where administrative headquarters, troop barracks and storage facilities are located.

While the increased activity indicates North Korea is preparing to conduct detonations, there are no signs that a nuclear test is being planned for the immediate future, the U.S.-Korea Institute said in its analysis posted on its blog, 38 North.

The report "corroborates what appears to be an unstoppable nuclear weapons program by North Korea," said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. "North Korea, based on everything that we know, is moving inexorably toward the creation of nuclear-tipped missiles that it will deploy sometime in the future."

Violating U.N. resolutions in December, North Korea successfully launched a multistage rocket whose technology is similar to that of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can hit targets hundreds of miles away.

The latest analysis strongly suggests that nuclear tests are in the works.

"We don't know when those tests will occur, but they will occur ... and these tests will bring North Korea closer and closer to a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can go on top of a missile and improve the quality of the warhead and, perhaps, the production of more nuclear warheads of a highly enriched uranium variety, not just the old plutonium variety that were part of the first two tests," Mr. Cronin said.

The U.S.-Korea Institute report coincides with a warning from a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on Wednesday that Pyongyang will expand its nuclear arsenal to counter what he called U.S. hostility.

"Increasing nuclear threat from outside will only compel [North Korea] to bolster up its nuclear deterrent to cope with this," the unidentified spokesman was quoted as saying by the North's official Korean Central News Agency.

Pyongyang is suspected of enhancing its uranium enrichment capabilities to develop nuclear weapons.

North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, in 2009 and in February have been met by progressively stringent U.N. Security Council sanctions.

Six-party talks aimed at ending the North's nuclear program stalled when Pyongyang walked out of negotiations in 2009. A year later, it disclosed a new uranium enrichment facility to visiting U.S. scientists.



Obama administration officials have made it clear that the ball is now in Pyongyang's court, said Jae Ku, director of the U.S.-Korea Institute.

"But the message to our officials at State and elsewhere is that we need to begin some kind of dialogue and that strategic patience is not a substitute for a policy," Mr. Ku said.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman said Pyongyang will not take a unilateral first step toward resolving the nuclear impasse: "Action for action remains a basic principle for finding a solution to the nuclear issue on the peninsula, and [North Korea] will, therefore, not unilaterally move first."

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/24/n-korea-preparing-another-nuke-test-report/?page=all#pagebreak

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Times of India - India

India likely to Acquire Another Nuclear-Powered Submarine from Russia on Lease

By Rajat Pandit, Tamil News Network (TNN) October 21, 2013

NEW DELHI: India now seems all set to acquire a second nuclear-powered submarine on lease from Russia, at a cost of about \$1.5 billion, to bolster its ageing underwater combat arm that took a major hit with the sinking of a conventional submarine in Mumbai in August.

While the over 8,000-tonne new steel shark will have a miniaturized nuclear reactor at its core for propulsion, it will not be armed with long-range nuclear missiles because of international treaties like the Missile Technology Control Regime.

But, much like the first leased submarine INS Chakra being currently operated by the Navy, it will act as a "potent hunter-killer" of enemy warships and submarines as well as have cruise missiles to hit land targets.

Capable of operating at extended ranges for long durations, unlike diesel-electric submarines that require to surface or "snorkel" every few days to get oxygen to re-charge their batteries, INS Chakra has added some desperately-needed muscle to the country's underwater fleet of just 13 conventional submarines.

With PM Manmohan Singh currently visiting Moscow, and defence minister A K Antony to follow suit on November 15-17, the contract for the second nuclear-powered submarine from Russia is "well on the cards" now, said sources.

The deal was under negotiation for the last four to five years, as earlier reported by TOI. But it gained ground after India formally inducted INS Chakra, the Akula-II class nuclear submarine called 'K-152 Nerpa', at Visakhapatnam in April last year on a 10-year lease from Russia after paying almost \$1 billion. "Moscow has been pushing the case for the second submarine for some time now... the exact terms of leasing are yet to be fully sorted out," said a source.

As part of a secretive deal inked with Russia in January 2004, India had funded a major part of Nerpa's construction at Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipyard after Russia stopped it midway due to funds crunch. It was slated for induction much earlier but technical glitches delayed the process, which included a toxic gas leak in November 2008 that killed 20 Russian sailors.

This time, India is looking for a "more advanced" submarine but may settle for another mothballed Akula submarine named 'Irbis', the construction of which again could not be completed due to financial problems after the USSR broke up in the early-1990s.

After initial teething problems, the Navy is now quite happy with INS Chakra, which is powered by a 190 mw reactor for a maximum speed of 30 knots and is armed with 300-km Klub-S land-attack cruise missiles and torpedoes.



But India's "nuclear weapons triad" — the ability to fire nukes from the air (fighters), land (missiles like Agni) and sea - will only become a reality when the indigenously-built 6,000-tonne INS Arihant is ready for "deterrent patrols" towards end-2014.

After its 83 mw pressurized light-water reactor went "critical" on August 11, INS Arihant is now being "readied for extensive sea-trials", which will include firing of its 750-km-range K-15 missiles, at Visakhapatnam. Only then will the third leg of the nuclear triad be in place.

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-10-21/india/43249261 1 ins-chakra-nerpa-ins-arihant (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Express Tribune - Pakistan

Seminar: Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine Has Failed to Curb Wars, Say Experts

By Our Correspondent October 25, 2013

ISLAMABAD: It is time to rethink the utility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and a "minimisation strategy" might be a good place to begin anti-nuclear advocacy efforts.

This was stated by Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister at a book launch and seminar organised by the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) on Thursday. Evans said nuclear weapons are practically "unusable," both because of the damage they might inflict in combat and the international taboo surrounding their use.

"Nuclear weapons are not deterring conventional attacks so where does the utility really lie?" said Evans, who has served on several international commissions including the 2008-10 Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. "It is important in the South Asian context to rethink the extent to which security has really improved by possession of nuclear weapons."

He said the way forward is to advocate a minimum nuclear deterrence level in nuclear policies. "Let's get an agreement on no-first-use. Let's get serious on curbing nuclear deployment," Evans said. "It is very tough to go to zero (nuclear weapons) but if we can minimise the number of nuclear weapons, that would make the world a lot safer."

Evans and Ramesh Thakur, director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament at Melbourne's Australian National University, were invited by ISS to speak about modern diplomacy to mark the launch of The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. The book was missing in action — participants were given forms to pre-order the book from the Oxford University Press instead — but the discussion turned to substantive issues as participants engaged the speakers to talk about nuclear non-proliferation and coercive diplomacy.

Responding to a question about military interventions on humanitarian grounds, Thakur, who has been closely associated with the United Nations (UN) in the past, said "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), a 2005 UN initiative to prevent "mass atrocity crimes," humanises diplomacy. Thakur said R2P's victim-centric view, its focus on prevention and its redefinition of sovereignty not as a right but as a responsibility are some of the ways the initiative puts focus on protecting people in conflict zones.

Evans said the criteria set by the R2P framework for military intervention worked well in the case of Libya. But then, he said, France, United Kingdom and the US — three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — "contemptuously" took matters into their own hands and went beyond the protection of civilians to carry out a regime change in Libya.

Evans said a consensus on the R2P has to be recreated in the Security Council and the three permanent members who defied it have to take responsibility.



The two Australia-based experts sounded as only people who have worked long enough to understand intricacies of global diplomacy and the UN system would sound: honest about the system's shortcomings, somewhat frustrated but defiant in the belief that the struggle to fix global problems must continue.

Earlier, Thakur said the nature of modern diplomacy has changed from the traditional representational diplomacy to include other forms such as shuttle diplomacy, celebrity diplomacy, multilateral efforts and "blue ribbon" commissions.

Evans said a commission could be considered successful if it contributes to building consensus by providing normative outcomes that achieve policy actions or clarify policy agenda. Clarity of objectives, sound leadership, effectiveness consultations, follow-up advocacy, ownership and timing are some of the 10 factors Evans said he thinks contribute to a commission's success.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 25th, 2013.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/622157/seminar-nuclear-deterrence-doctrine-has-failed-to-curb-wars-say-experts/
(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Times - China

Russia to Upgrade All Missile Systems by 2021

Xinhua, October 23, 2013 By Agencies

Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) would be fully equipped with fifth-generation missile systems by 2021, the Defense Ministry said Wednesday.

Nearly 60 percent of the RVSN would have the latest systems by 2016 and 98 percent by 2021, ministry spokesman Igor Yegorov told reporters.

In addition to the fifth-generation Yars and Topol-M missiles, new command and control centers would be built and new communications, security and other systems would be put into service, he said.

According to the spokesman, the modernization was aimed at building the capacity to penetrate the anti-missile defense systems being deployed by NATO and the United States.

Earlier in October, a defense committee of the parliament's lower house, or State Duma, submitted proposals for the 2014-2016 federal budget to spend more than 46 billion rubles (\$1.4 billion) on nuclear weapons building and maintenance.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in September the budget deficit would not result in cuts to military procurement plans until 2020.

Earlier this year, President Vladimir Putin said nuclear weapons remained the most important guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and integrity.

Russia plans to upgrade some 85 percent of its strategic nuclear weapons by 2020. The government has earmarked 20 trillion rubles (about \$600 billion) for the massive rearmament program until 2020.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/819854.shtml

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Moscow Needs More 'Predictability' in NATO Missile Defense Plans

23 October 2013



MOSCOW, October 23 (RIA Novosti) – Russia aims to cooperate with Western powers on security issues but needs guarantees that a US missile shield in Eastern Europe would not target its nuclear forces, Russia's defense minister said Wednesday.

"We have failed to work jointly on this issue. The European missile defense programs are developing, and our [Russia's] concerns are not being taken into account," Sergei Shoigu told journalists after a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels.

"Before launching missile defense projects, we need to have firm judicial assurances that the US missile defense system will not be used against Russian nuclear deterrence forces," he said adding that Moscow "does not have enough predictability regarding the US and NATO missile defense plans."

Shoigu also stressed that "mutually beneficial cooperation" would contribute to the strengthening of each state's security.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: "It is no secret that we have not yet found the way to work together [in this area]." But "ministerial discussions are valuable in addressing existing concerns, and we need to continue to engage frankly and directly to overcome our differences."

The US missile defense system in Europe, which NATO and the US say is aimed at countering threats from North Korea and Iran, has been a particular source of friction in US-Russian relations for a number of years.

Russia and NATO formally agreed to cooperate over the European missile defense system at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, but talks foundered, in part over Russian demands for legal guarantees that the system would not target its strategic nuclear deterrent.

In mid-March, the US announced that it was modifying its planned missile defense deployment to Poland, dropping plans to station SM-3 IIB interceptors in the country by 2022.

Russian officials responded by saying this did nothing to allay their concerns over US missile defense in Eastern Europe, and reiterated their demand for legally binding agreements guaranteeing that Russia's strategic nuclear forces would not be targeted.

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20131023/184317160/Moscow-Needs-More-Predictability-in-NATO-Missile-Defense-Plans.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Russia & India Report – India

Russia's Hypersonic Trump Card Edges Closer to Reality

The RS-26 Rubezh will significantly expand the ability of Russian strategic nuclear forces to overcome missile defence systems

By Dmitriy Litovkin, especially for RIR October 23, 2013

By the end of this year, Moscow will test its newest ballistic missile, the RS-26 Rubezh (which means frontier in Russian) equipped with hypersonic manoeuvring nuclear units. As Colonel General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, said to Vladimir Putin, this system will significantly expand the ability of Russian strategic nuclear forces to overcome missile defence systems. The technical specifications of the new missile have not been disclosed. However, public recognition of the fact that it has "hypersonic manoeuvring nuclear units" indicates it is an ultimate weapon.

"Ballistic missiles have a certain trajectory and power supply capacity. It is rather difficult to reach beyond these parameters in the development of new models of this type," says Vladimir Dvorkin, the former head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence (the institution that studies the effects of nuclear weapons). "So currently the only thing that can be upgraded is most likely the warhead of ballistic missiles."



Back in 1997, then Chief of General Staff Yury Baluyevsky announced proudly that Russia had developed a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV). Its flight path is non-classical, meaning it doesn't follow the classic parabola like a modern nuclear warhead, but can arbitrarily change directions. HCVs can enter outer space, and then re-enter the earth's atmosphere. A conventional nuclear warhead enters the dense layers of the atmosphere at a speed of 5,000 metres per second. The speed of the HCV is twice as high. This makes it very hard to detect with radar missile defence systems. In addition, as military personnel note, the HCV can be retargeted throughout its entire flight, unlike conventional warheads.

In early 1997 engineers from the Raduga Design Bureau in Dubna (located just outside Moscow) displayed a new class of airborne vehicle -- the Kh-90 hypersonic experimental cruise missile -- at the International Aviation Aerospace Salon (MAKS) in Zhukovsky. In the West, it was called the AS-19 Koala.

This rocket was made to replace the Kh-55 strategic cruise missile that is carried by the Tu-160 bomber. Its flight range was 3,000 km. The missile could carry two warheads with individual guidance, each capable of hitting targets at a distance of 100 km from the point of separation. The carrier of the X-90 was to be a modernised version of the Tu-160M strategic bomber. However, according to official data, work on the missile was suspended in 1992.

There were also more exotic designs. For example, one of the missile design bureaus proposed placing several supersonic or hypersonic cruise missiles instead of a nuclear warhead in a heavy ballistic missile. The designers thought that with this weapon, the Soviet Union would have been able to engage U.S. aircraft carrier fleets anywhere in the world directly from Siberia. A ballistic missile would carry the warhead into the targeted area, and there the cruise missiles themselves would detect and strike the target. The idea was abandoned because of its exorbitant cost, and the Koala was left as the only tangible evidence of the scientists' hypersonic research. All other development was kept top secret.

But after the United States stepped up its own work on hypersonic cruise vehicles, Moscow returned to its own hypersonic "trump cards," including the RS-26 Rubezh "manoeuvring nuclear unit" ballistic missile.

http://indrus.in/economics/2013/10/23/russias hypersonic trump card edges closer to reality 30325.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The London Guardian - U.K.

Trident Deal Would Be Delayed Until 2016, Says Alex Salmond

First minister says that if Scotland votes yes in referendum and if SNP wins re-election, he will ask for nuclear fleet to be moved

By Severin Carrell, Scotland correspondent Sunday, 20 October 2013

Alex Salmond says a future SNP government would resist demands for Trident to remain in Scotland through a deal to lease the Clyde submarine base in same way that the UK leases its base on Cyprus. Photograph: Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images

Alex Salmond has said a final deal on removing Trident nuclear submarines from an independent Scotland would be delayed until 2016 and remain conditional on his party being re-elected.

In an interview on the Andrew Marr show on BBC1, Scotland's first minister appeared to soften his stance on the immediate future of the Trident fleet on the Clyde in the event of a yes vote in next September's independence referendum.

Salmond told the Scottish National party's annual conference on Saturday that a white paper setting out his government's key proposals for independence would be published on 26 November, four days before Scotland celebrates St Andrew's Day.



He told Marr that a future SNP government would resist demands from the UK government for Trident to remain in Scotland through a deal to lease the Clyde submarine base in same way that the UK leases its base on Cyprus.

The SNP would insist on the weapons being removed, he said. "A country has the right to say we don't want to possess nuclear weapons, either our own or anyone else's."

The future of the Trident fleet is one of the most contentious in the Scottish independence debate: removing the fleet and the warheads and building a new base and nuclear weapons complex in England or Wales would be difficult, time-consuming and cost billions.

But Salmond implied that Trident's fate would not be decided during the 18 months of independence negotiations that would start within days of a yes vote on 18 September 2014, when Scottish and UK ministers would be wrestling over a currency deal, sharing national debt, splitting up the UK's North Sea oil and gas fields and sharing welfare and pension arrangements.

He said: "The time period for their removal: once Scotland became independent and after, of course, people have elected their first government in an independent Scotland, but if it were to be an SNP government then we would ask the submarines to be removed from Scotland as soon as was safely possible. And the emphasis, obviously on safety, because no one would want to compromise that in any way."

That apparent concession is significant for the independence talks. Although this has not been accepted yet by the UK government, Salmond wants Scotland to declare its independence formally and legally in March 2016, with its first parliamentary elections in May 2016.

That longer timetable would allow both governments more time to prepare for a well-ordered withdrawal and relocation of Trident, giving ministers in Westminster more breathing space to consider their options.

But crucially for Salmond, that tone of compromise also suggests his government is worried about its chances of joining Nato. The Scottish government has been warned that joining the alliance – a policy which is crucial to win over mainstream Scottish voters to independence – would be conditional on a full and mutually agreed settlement on Trident.

Angus Robertson, the SNP's defence spokesman and leader at Westminster, said Salmond was being consistent with government policy. "We would like to see talks taking place on this now to help prepare for a possible yes vote, as indeed the Westminster defence select committee recommended," he said.

"Trident would certainly be part of negotiations following a yes vote. Of course Trident could only be removed from Scotland once Scotland becomes an indy country, and SNP policy on that is clear, which is at the earliest possible safe moment."

In his interview, Salmond confirmed that Scotland would expect to split up the UK armed forces by taking control over "assets" in the British army, RAF and Royal Navy, including large surface ships. But the Scottish defence force would continue to co-operate closely with the UK armed forces and other Nato partners.

Despite opinion polls showing a healthy lead for the no campaign, Salmond said he was confident his party would win the referendum. A large majority of voters in Scotland trusted his government above David Cameron's in Westminster, he said.

"Identity is of course important to people but it's also a question of where best Scotland should be governed from and where people trust the parliament, the government to be," he said. "And I think that the majority of people in Scotland trust the government in Edinburgh, trust the Scottish government to operate in Scottish interests, and a very small minority of people trust the UK government."

 $\underline{\text{http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/20/trident-alex-salmond}}$

(Return to Articles and Documents List)



The Voice of Russia - Russia

US Adding to Nuclear Weapon Capacity, Despite Obama's Pledges

By Crystal Park 19 October 2013

WASHINGTON (VOR) — A new report by the independent science advocacy organization, The Union of Concerned Scientists, targets the U.S.'s plans to build a new plutonium research facility in New Mexico.

Lisbeth Gronlund, co-author of the report, "Making Smart Security Choices: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex," says it's troubling that the Obama administration seems to be expanding the nation's nuclear capabilities, even though the president has pledged to decrease them.

"One of the things that the administration promised not to do was to build new kinds of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons are to become a less significant part of our security policy, you wouldn't be continuing to develop new ones, deploy new ones, and that was in fact a pledge that the Obama administration made, which it now seems that the current plans on the part of the nuclear weapons establishment is just the opposite of that, is in fact to build a new set of nuclear weapons, which sends really the wrong signal to the rest of the world."

http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2013_10_19/US-adding-to-nuclear-weapon-capacity-despite-Obamas-pledges-8316/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Herald Sun - Australia

Officers Who Hold the Trigger for US Nuclear Forces Caught Leaving the Blast-Doors Open

By Associated Press (AP) October 23, 2013

THEY hold the trigger to the world's biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons. So why have they been caught napping, with the bomb-proof doors left wide open?

Twice this year alone, US Air Force officers entrusted with the launch keys to nuclear-tipped missiles have been caught leaving open a blast door that is intended to help prevent terrorists or other intruders from entering their underground command post.

It's also supposed to protect them from a surprise nuclear attack.

In the two episodes confirmed by the Air Force, the multi-ton concrete-and-steel door that seals the entrance to the underground launch control center was deliberately left open while one of two crew members inside napped.

One officer lied about a violation but later admitted to it.

The rules are simple: The blast doors are never to be left open if one of the crew members inside is asleep - as was the case in both these instances - out of concern for the damage an intruder could cause.

Not to mention the potential to steal secret launch codes.

Transgressions such as this are rarely revealed publicly. But officials with direct knowledge of Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile operations told the Associated Press that such violations have happened, undetected, many more times than in the cases of the two launch crew commanders and two deputy commanders who were given administrative punishments this year.

One confirmed blast door violation happened in May at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. In that case a person who entered the capsule to do maintenance work realised that the deputy crew commander was asleep with the door open



and reported the violation to superiors. Upon questioning, the deputy crew commander initially denied the accusation but later confessed and said her crew commander had encouraged her to lie, Sheets said.

The crew commander received a letter of reprimand and was ordered to forfeit \$3,045 in pay for two months, Sheets said. The deputy crew commander was given a letter of reprimand. Punishment of that sort does not require the officer to leave the service but usually is a significant obstacle to promotion and could mean an early end to his or her career.

Morale problems

The blast door violations are another sign of serious trouble in the handling of the United States' nuclear arsenal.

A series of problems has been uncovered within the ICBM force, including a failed safety inspection, the temporary sidelining of launch officers deemed unfit for duty and the abrupt firing last week of the two-star general in charge. The problems, including low morale, underscore the challenges of keeping safe such a deadly force that is constantly on alert but is unlikely ever to be used.

The crews who operate the missiles are trained to follow rules without fail, including the prohibition against having the blast door open when only one crew member is awake, because the costs of a mistake are so high.

The officers, known as missileers, are custodians of keys that could launch nuclear hell. The warheads on the business ends of their missiles are capable of a nuclear yield many times that of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945.

"The only way that you can have a crew member be in 'rest status' is if that blast door is shut and there is no possibility of anyone accessing the launch control center," said Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. He is responsible for the entire force of 450 Minuteman 3 missiles, plus the Air Force's nuclear-capable bombers.

Rock-solid defence

The written Air Force instruction on ICBM weapon safety, last updated in June 1996, says, "One crewmember at a time may sleep on duty, but both must be awake and capable of detecting an unauthorized act if ... the Launch Control Center blast door is open" or if someone other than the crew is present.

The blast door is not the first line of defense. An intruder intent on taking control of a missile command post would first face many layers of security before encountering the blast door, which - when closed - is secured by 12 hydraulically operated steel pins.

The door is at the base of an elevator shaft. Entry to that elevator is controlled from an above-ground building. ICBM missile fields are monitored with security cameras and patrolled regularly by armed Air Force guards.

Each underground launch center, known as a capsule for its pill-like shape, monitors and operates 10 Minuteman 3 missiles.

The missiles stand in reinforced concrete silos and are linked to the control center by buried communications cables. The ICBMs are split evenly among "wings" based in North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana. Each wing is divided into three squadrons, each responsible for 50 missiles.

In neither of the two reported violations was security of the crews' missiles compromised, the Air Force said in response to questions from the AP, "due to the multiple safeguards and other protections in place." But these were clear-cut violations of what the Air Force calls "weapon system safety rules" meant to be strictly enforced in keeping with the potentially catastrophic, consequences of a breach of nuclear security.

Sleep breaks are allowed during a 24-hour shift, known as an "alert." But a written rule says the door - meant to keep others out and to protect the crew from the blast effects of a direct nuclear strike - must be closed if one is napping.

Code of silence



In an extensive interview last week at his headquarters at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, Kowalski declined to say whether he was aware that ICBM launch crew members had violated the blast door rule on multiple occasions.

"I'm not aware of it being any different than it's ever been before," he said. "And if it had happened out there in the past and was tolerated, it is not tolerated now. So my sense of this is, if we know they're doing it they'll be disciplined for it."

It is clear that Air Force commanders do, in fact, know these violations are happening. One of the officers punished for a blast door violation in April at the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, admitted during questioning by superiors to having done it other times without getting caught.

Both officers involved in that case were given what the military calls non-judicial punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, rather than court martialed. One was ordered to forfeit \$2,246 in pay for two months and received a letter of reprimand, according to Lt. Col. John Sheets, spokesman for Air Force Global Strike Command. The other launch officer, who admitted to having committed the same violation "a few" times previously, was given a letter of admonishment, Sheets said.

Kowalski said the crews know better.

"This is not a training problem. This is some people out there are having a problem with discipline," he said.

Concerned officers leak details

The AP was tipped off to the Malmstrom episode shortly after it happened by an official who felt strongly that it should be made public and that it reflected a more deeply rooted disciplinary problem inside the ICBM force. The AP learned of the Minot violation through an internal Air Force email. The AP confirmed both incidents with several other Air Force officials.

Sheets said the Minot and Malmstrom violations were the only blast door disciplinary cases in at least two years.

The willingness of some launch officers to leave the blast door open at times reflects a mindset far removed from the Cold War days when the U.S. lived in fear of a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. It was that fear that provided the original rationale for placing ICBMs in reinforced underground silos and the launch control officers in buried capsules so that in the event of an attack the officers might survive to launch a counterattack.

Today the fear of such an attack has all but disappeared and, with it, the appeal of strictly following the blast door rule.

 $\frac{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-trigger-for-us-nuclear-forces-caught-leaving-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-the-blast-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220}{\text{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/world/officers-who-hold-doors-open/story-fni0xs61-1226744956220$

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Great Falls Tribune - Great Falls, MT

Malmstrom Reports 'Highest Possible Grade' in Nuclear Inspection redo

By Jenn Rowell, Great Falls Tribune Staff Writer October 24, 2013

The 341st Missile Wing received a perfect score Thursday on a nuclear inspection redo.

The redo involved the two areas that were rated unsatisfactory during the original Nuclear Surety Inspection in August.

"The inspectors found absolutely no errors and deficiencies throughout the inspection," said Capt. Chase McFarland, base spokesman. "The wing received the highest possible grade."

The NSI included 13 inspection areas and in August, the wing received 10 exceptional ratings and one satisfactory in addition to two unsatisfactory ratings tied to the same incident during the exercise, said Col. Robert Stanley, the 341st Missile Wing commander.



"The 341st Missile Wing demands exacting focus, attention to detail, discipline and dedication to the highest principles and standards from every single nuclear airman," Stanley said. "I am extremely proud of every member of Wing One — we were determined to prove to the world that we truly are the best at what we do day in and day out. We came into this inspection with something to prove, and our people are walking out with a perfect score and their heads held high."

The inspection is pass/fail, and Air Force regulations require a redo within 90 days of any areas not rated satisfactory. The redo was originally scheduled for earlier this month but was delayed due to the government shutdown.

The inspection occurs every two years for units that handle nuclear weapons. According to Air Force Global Strike Command, which oversees the 341st, the NSI is designed to evaluate safe, secure and effective unit nuclear mission capability.

"Every single one of these nuclear airmen understands the incredible responsibility and standards of perfection that come with the nuclear deterrence mission. They continue to accomplish their mission with great skill, professionalism and dedication," Stanley said. "These dedicated warriors continuously prove they deserve the utmost respect and confidence in their ability to provide the United States and the world with reliable nuclear deterrence."

Col. David Lynch, 341st Security Forces Group commander, was relieved from command in August for a loss of confidence, according to base officials. Air Force officials said the removal was not related to the exercise, though he was removed of command the week following the failure.

 $\frac{http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20131024/NEWS01/310240036/Malmstrom-gets-perfect-score-redo-nuclear-inspection$

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Defense One.com
OPINION/Commentary

In Defense of the Nuclear Triad

By Peter Huessy October 18, 2013

CATO Institute researchers, in a new report, conclude we can kill our nuclear bombers and land based missiles and save \$20 billion a year. They assert bombers and missiles have a sharply diminishing role in that you cannot use such weapons against terrorist threats. They further claim the world is so safe that there is no adversary that would seek to destroy our nuclear deterrent, so reducing our force from 500 potential targets (bombers, missiles and submarines) to less than 10 (just the submarines) is without risk.

Though both Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear arsenals at a pace not seen even during the height of the Cold War, CATO's team says we should cut ours unilaterally.

CATO's claims are without foundation.

The cost of all nuclear forces today is \$23 billion a year, according to Deputy Defense Secretary Ash Carter. That includes 60 nuclear bombers, 12 Trident submarines and 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, plus their associated facilities. It also includes related nuclear laboratories and communications capability.

Killing all ICBMs would save at most \$1 billion a year, if there were no costs to closing the three related Minuteman bases. But closing bases costs money, and those costs will eat 40 percent of the projected savings. Eliminating the new strategic bomber from a nuclear deterrent role saves at most 5 percent of the acquisition and R&D costs, or \$250 million a year. Eliminating the conventional capability of these bombers as well -- which CATO is unclear on whether it supports -- would eliminate a significant ability of the United States to strategically project a conventional force overseas. Substituting a carrier battle group capability or forward deployed tactical aircraft would cost tens of billions more each year. So, annual savings from cutting all ICBMs and the nuclear capability of our bombers would account for



less than \$1 billion a year over the first ten years and slightly more over the next decade after that. Putting aside the paltry savings, is there merit to rethinking the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy that CATO says is no longer relevant?

Much is made of the notion that nuclear weapons have no role against terrorists. But our conventional and police capability also did not deter 9/11. So, should we conclude such capabilities are not relevant to our security? And despite our soldier's heroic efforts, state-sponsored terrorism remains a top threat and is not easy to contain.

CATO misses the mark entirely when it comes to U.S. nuclear security doctrine. The central mission of our nuclear deterrent is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by any of the great world powers. It is not to actually use them in war. And at least four of our adversaries have nuclear weapons. Fifteen times in the past half-decade, Russians have explicitly threatened the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its allies.

The key issue is whether the U.S. and Russia might come eyeball to eyeball. In a crisis, we may then find our interests are being threatened. Russia may seek to keep the U.S. out of a theater of operations and have a free hand with which to operate. And thus it may contemplate the use of military force -- including nuclear weapons -- to achieve its objectives.

In that respect, our nuclear forces must have three characteristics. They must be credible to our adversaries. They must invite stability, meaning any adversary must conclude the use of such weapons cannot be undertaken successfully. And our nuclear deterrent must hold at risk an adversary's forces so they cannot remain in a sanctuary, freely able to threaten the US.

Practically, what does this mean? Credible means that the American nuclear force must be invulnerable to any future change in technology. Nothing can change the current ability of 450 separate ICBM silos and 50 launch control facilities to withstand an attack. No sane Russian planner would contemplate trying to simultaneously destroy all of these targets.

But a technology "surprise" could make the U.S. submarine force vulnerable. Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations and a former submariner, in the July 2012 issue of the naval magazine *Proceedings*, said that an ability to find ships at sea was a capability on the horizon that most worried him. Over time our submarines at sea could be attrited without our being able to determine who was taking them out. A too limited or small force is an invitation to the Russians and Chinese to "come get us".

Having all three legs of our triad means we have technology insurance -- if there are problems with any one of our legs, the other two can do the job while we repair the first. Bombers are recallable and subs cannot now be found. The ICBMs remain highly stabilizing in that they cannot be attacked with stealth. They require such a high number of attacking warheads to take them out that we leave an adversary with two choices: invite Armageddon or do nothing with nuclear weapons.

For nearly 70 years of the nuclear age, our adversaries have concluded just that -- do nothing with nuclear forces. Our 500 nuclear assets when presented to an adversary during a crisis quickly leads to their conclusion: "Not today, comrade". Reducing our deterrent to 12 submarines, which CATO recommends, puts our nuclear eggs in very few baskets -- eight submarines at sea and the rest at two naval bases.

In a world of 400 current conflicts involving militias, terror groups, state sponsors of terror, guerilla groups and tribal armies, in some 62 countries, it is remarkable that no central nuclear power has been drawn into using nuclear weapons. That is because our deterrent has worked perfectly for nearly 70 years.

Finally, the U.S. cannot do these things in a vacuum. Unilaterally wiping out some 1000 to 1200 or more American nuclear warheads would be a harsh jolt to the security of the international system. Already Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies have expressed concern they will be forced to adopt nuclear weapons in their respective national arsenals if we diminish our deterrent.



In short, CATO's radical and unwise plan saves very little money; creates huge instabilities; invites attack over time on our remaining deterrent the U.S. nuclear deterrent force; and threatens to divorce our allies in Europe and East Asia from our nuclear umbrella, spurring further nuclear proliferation. On top of which, the threats to our security from nascent nuclear weapons states -- North Korea and Iran -- are where real serious nuclear dangers lie, whether from the surreptitiously delivery of nuclear weapons in an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack on our country or the detonation of an Iranian nuclear device somewhere in an American city. Those are serious threats that much be addressed as well. CATO diverts our attention to the wrong issue -- the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The central role of our nuclear deterrent triad is to keep any crisis from escalating to a nuclear conflict. That requires a credible, stable and effective deterrent triad. Each successive administration from Eisenhower to the present, through 70 years of nuclear history, has so concluded.

Peter Huessy is president of GeoStrategic Analysis.

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/10/defense-nuclear-triad/72242/

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Japan Times – Japan OPINION/Commentary

Nuclear Arms Wake-Up Call

By Ramesh Thakur October 21, 2013

HO, CHI MINH CITY – Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity that is unmatched by any other contemporary threat in magnitude, gravity and urgency.

Consider the indicators of the high policy salience of the nuclear weapons challenge: the new START Treaty between Russia and the United States, President Barack Obama's speech in Berlin in June 2013, North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013, tightening sanctions on Iran to compel it to abandon a suspected nuclear weaponization path, unresolved tensions between India and Pakistan, growing nuclear arsenals of China, India and Pakistan, and the fear of an act of nuclear terrorism that lies behind the series of past and forthcoming nuclear security summits.

The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN: apln.anu.edu.au) is a group of about 40 people from 14 countries in Asia and the Pacific dedicated to halting then reversing the nuclear weapons drift. While most are former heads of government, Cabinet ministers, heads of departments and military forces, others are key opinion shapers and movers from the media, universities and civil society.

The group met most recently in Ho Chi Minh City and issued a declaration on Oct. 13 calling on present world leaders to act now to resolve the problem of nuclear weapons because "the risks associated with the possession of nuclear weapons in today's world far outweigh any deterrent utility they may have had in the past or continue to have."

The Ho Chi Minh City Declaration noted that Asia and the Pacific is the only region in the world where the number of nuclear weapons is growing with expanding arsenals in China, India and Pakistan and the growing sophistication of their weapons, delivery systems and platforms and doctrines of use.

Nuclear policymaking in Asia, as elsewhere, is still trapped in the Cold War habits of mind, in which too much reliance is placed upon dubious arguments about the utility of nuclear deterrence and not enough on the risks of nuclear weapons.

In the short and medium term, the APLN called for freezing and reducing existing nuclear weapon stockpiles, minimizing their deployment and amending nuclear doctrine to dramatically reduce reliance on them. In the longer term, they called for overcoming the technical, geopolitical and psychological barriers to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They urged the United States to speed up the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while also pressing China, India and Pakistan not to wait upon U.S. Senate ratification before joining the CTBT.



Moscow and Washington are encouraged to negotiate a follow-on agreement to New START that will move beyond reduction in the number of deployed strategic weapons, to major reductions in the number of all nuclear weapons in their respective stockpiles; to reduce significantly the number of nuclear weapons deployed with launch-on-warning alert status; and to commit to the principle of "No First Use" in their respective nuclear doctrines.

Washington was urged also to address the concerns of Russia and China about the potentially destabilizing impact of its Ballistic Missile Defense program, and the further development of conventional capability, particularly Conventional Prompt Global Strike.

China, India and Pakistan are being asked not to increase their nuclear weapons numbers from their present relatively low levels and to enter into both bilateral (China-India, Pakistan-India) and trilateral strategic dialogues.

In addition, India and Pakistan are both asked to refrain from developing new nuclear weapon systems, including battlefield nuclear weapons, new missile delivery systems and ballistic missile defense.

Individually China is encouraged to maintain a "No First Use" nuclear posture and to take all possible steps to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons facilities and capability.

India is asked to adopt a "No First Use" posture without qualification (it presently reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if attacked by biological or chemical weapons). Pakistan is urged to cooperate in the commencement of serious formal negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, designed to halt further production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and to embrace the "No First Use" principle.

North Korea is urged to immediately freeze the production and testing of fissile material, nuclear weapons and delivery systems; to enter into serious negotiations, and complete them expeditiously, to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability, in the context of achieving the permanent denuclearization of, and sustainable peace on, the Korean Peninsula; and to rejoin the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state.

U.S. allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea are asked to accept a significantly reduced role for nuclear weapons in their security protection, in particular by accepting and encouraging moves by the U.S. toward embracing the principle of "No First Use" in its nuclear doctrine.

In addition, in the first instance, they should support a U.S. declaration that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is, so long as nuclear weapons exist, to deter their use by others.

The APLN emphasized that movement toward disarmament should not be held hostage to improvement in the overall geopolitical situation, globally or within our region. The two are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and should properly be pursued in parallel.

Finally APLN members agreed that an Asia-Pacific Nuclear Energy Community could strengthen nuclear energy governance in the region, across all three crucial areas of safeguards, safety and security. However, many complex and sensitive issues would need further study by governments, industry and civil society before the idea can bear fruit.

Accordingly individual and state champions are needed to place the proposal on the agenda of regional governments through an existing regional dialogue forum. ASEAN seems likely to be the forum in which there is the greatest commonality of interest in the matters that might be dealt with by a nuclear energy community.

Member states should encourage ASEAN to initiate a study on the pros and cons of the community concept, including the possibility of such a community extending in due course beyond ASEAN to its various dialogue partners.

Professor Ramesh Thakur is director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University. CNND functions as the secretariat for the APLN.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/10/21/commentary/nuclear-arms-wake-up-call/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)



The Hill OPINION/Congress Blog

Three Reasons the US Should Pay Attention to Israel's Iran Fears

By Clare M. Lopez October 21, 2013

At the U.N. on Oct. 1, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed concern that, while Iranian President Rouhani blinds the world with his 'charm offensive,' Iran is preparing to race to nuclear weapons status. The Iranians accused him of being inflammatory – but Netanyahu's fears are legitimate and Iran's threatening capabilities ought to be considered seriously by the United States.

In particular, this is because an Iranian capability to execute a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack could collapse the electric grid and other critical U.S. infrastructure that sustains our economy, society, and the lives of more than 310 million Americans.

1. "Why would a country with a peaceful nuclear program develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear warheads?" asked Netanyahu.

A reasonable question given that Iran already has demonstrated the capability to launch a ballistic missile from a freighter at sea. An EMP attack launched from a ship is a 'worst case nightmare scenario' according to the EMP Commission. It would leave no "fingerprints" and could be accomplished anonymously, with little or no fear of U.S. retaliation.

2. "While we were talking to the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in Isfahan," quoted Netanyahu from President Rouhani's 2011 book.

The Isfahan facility converts uranium ore into its enrichable form. Iran, aided by North Korea, has also launched several satellites on polar orbits using its so-called Space Launch Vehicle, which is really a disguised ICBM, potentially to practice a surprise nuclear EMP attack. A nuclear warhead disguised as a satellite that approached the U.S. from the South, where the U.S. has no ballistic missile early warning radars or interceptors, would blind side us. For these reasons, the Congressional EMP Commission warned: "Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear warheads may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them--or threatening their use--in an EMP attack."

3. "In 2005 North Korea agreed to a deal that was celebrated the world over," Netanyahu reminded the assembly, but then "a year later, North Korea exploded its first nuclear device."

A Super-EMP warhead likely would be small enough for delivery against the U.S. mainland by North Korea's long-range missiles. Indeed, because an EMP attack detonates the warhead high in the atmosphere, a weapon designed for EMP attack does not need a re-entry vehicle or heat shield, which are usually the heaviest components of a nuclear warhead. Thus, rogue states like North Korea and Iran whose long-range missiles are constrained in payload size, may find an EMP attack most attractive because it is the easiest nuclear strike option to engineer--and by far the most damaging.

Currently, Iran is not believed to have the capability of executing a nuclear attack against the homeland, but as PM Netanyahu said, it is positioning itself to race across that threshold at a moment's notice. That does not mean that both Israel and the United States are not currently at risk. Debilitating and catastrophic EMP attacks on the United States are possible, now. The U.S. is neither doing enough to hinder an attack from abroad nor defending our electrical grid domestically.

Contemporary U.S. society is not structured, nor does it have the means, to provide for the needs of over 310 million Americans without electricity. In 2012 Rep. Trent Franks (R-Ariz.) introduced the SHIELD Act (Secure high-voltage infrastructure for Electricity from lethal Damage Act) and he re-introduced the bill in June 2013. The act encourages



cooperation between industry and government in the development, promulgation, and implementation of standards and processes that are necessary to address the current shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the electric grid from a major EMP event. Attention needs to be drawn to H.R. 2417 so that action can be taken to protect our electrical grid sooner rather than later because as Israel has pointed out, the threat is already upon us.

Lopez, a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy, is a strategic policy and intelligence expert with a focus on national defense, Islam, Iran, and counterterrorism issues. She formerly was a career operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency.

 $\frac{http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/329371-three-reasons-the-us-should-pay-attention-to-israels-iran-fears$

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Post OPINION/Fine Print

The Sequester: A New Lever for Reducing the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal?

By Walter Pincus October 21, 2013

Will the threat of a continued sequester yield rational changes to the U.S. nuclear weapons program?

It won't save much money in the short run, but it's an opportunity to apply some logic to the Cold War thinking that hangs over these most destructive weapons.

The fiscal 2014 continuing resolution, thanks to sequestration, cuts almost \$1 billion from President Obama's requested \$7.9 billion for the weapons program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Energy Department outfit that runs the nation's nuclear weapons complex.

If the \$6.9 billion projected by the Congressional Budget Office for the NNSA weapons program is maintained for fiscal 2014, it "could soon accomplish what arms control activists have repeatedly failed to do, curbing the rapid growth of the U.S. nuclear weapons budget," according to an analysis in the Albuquerque Journal, the New Mexico newspaper that closely follows the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories.

Budget cuts have already affected long-range Defense Department plans to replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems. The next generation of Ohio-class strategic submarines has been cut by two — to 12 — and development work on the first one has been extended by two years. Research for a new strategic bomber and a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have slowed.

Long term, it's the replacement of the delivery systems that could cost more than \$100 billion in future years. But the bombers can carry conventional weapons, the submarines can serve alternative functions and the ICBMs can be upgraded to last for over a decade more.

It's been one of the ironies of the Obama administration that in order to get enough GOP Senate support for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia in 2010, the president had to agree to increase over the next decade the money spent on the nuclear weapons complex. He also had to agree to replace the three types of delivery systems.

Oddly, in contrast, while President George W. Bush sharply reduced the number of strategic nuclear weapons, he was never pressed to spend the large amounts needed to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, much of which dates to the Manhattan Project.

So, over the past three years, Congress, with administration support, has kept increasing funds for the nuclear weapons program while other discretionary spending, including for defense, was being cut. Funds grew incrementally from \$6.8 billion in fiscal 2010 to \$7.56 billion in fiscal 2013.



One problem: Increased costs of NNSA projects have eaten up what's been appropriated. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has for years put the NNSA on its "high-risk list" because of its poor planning, bad financial management, and waste and abuse in major construction contracts.

For example, the aging plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory was set for replacement. In 2005, the NNSA approved the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project at an estimated cost of \$975 million.

By 2010 the cost had "increased six-fold . . . to an estimated high of \$5.8 billion," the GAO said. Though the GOP forced Obama to fund CMRR plans as part of the New START deal, the administration deferred its construction for five years in order to pay for higher-priority projects such as the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

A GAO report released in July said that since 2010 the "UPF had experienced significant cost increases. More recently, the upper bound of the UPF's cost range has increased from approximately \$1.1 billion in 2004 to \$6.5 billion."

Last week, the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit science advocacy group that questions spending on the nuclear program, issued a report that claimed the UPF "may have more capacity than needed to produce new canned [nuclear weapon] subassemblies." It called for a delay in constructing the costly UPF "until the production capacity required to support the stockpile is clearer."

So just what does the United States need?

Forget going to zero. Nuclear weapons will not vanish, and therefore this country must maintain a complex of facilities to continue to monitor its stockpile and ensure the weapons that remain are secure and reliable.

Numbers are set by treaties with Russia. By February 2018, each country is limited to 800 delivery systems — land-based or submarine-based ICBMs or strategic bombers — but only 700 can be deployed. The number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads will go down to 1,550, but there is no cap on non-deployed warheads.

As of April 2013, according to State Department figures, Russia already was eight below the 500 limit in deployed delivery systems. The United States was over by 92. Both countries were 200 above in non-deployed systems. Russia also had 70 fewer deployed warheads than allowed by the 2010 treaty while the United States was above the 2018 limit by 104.

Cold War veterans and Obama critics want to tie further nuclear reductions to Moscow's actions. They cite Russia's several thousand tactical nuclear weapons as a barrier to the United States going below New START levels in strategic or tactical weapons.

The Cold War is over. Threats have changed, and new thinking is required. Two nuclear weapons ended World War II, killing or injuring upwards of 200,000 people. Today's strategic warheads have much greater explosive power and play more of a foreign policy or domestic political role rather than an actual military one.

Fewer would be better, and it is almost funny that it is their cost — which, comparatively, is minimal — rather than logic that ultimately may force a change in nuclear weapons policy.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-sequester-a-new-lever-for-cutting-nukes/2013/10/21/8a50e948-382b-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f story.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Pakistan Today.com – Pakistan OPINION/Comment

Beware Pakistan's Small Nuclear Weapons

The most significant development in recent years By: Ahmed Rashid October 23, 2013



Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's meeting with President Barack Obama at the White House on Wednesday was critical for the future course of US-Pakistan relations. One issue at the top of the agenda – alongside the future of Afghanistan, Pakistan's own much-weakened state and attacks by terrorist groups – is said to be the country's nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan's rapid development of battlefield nuclear weapons raises many questions in the region and abroad.

Western analysts estimate Pakistan has between 100 and 120 nuclear weapons, far more than its rival India, which is believed to have 90-100. Pakistan has multiple delivery capability, such as long and short-range rockets and aircraft. It will soon add naval capability with sea-launched missiles.

Less well-known is that Pakistan has one of the fastest growing battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons programmes in the world today, according to senior western officials I have spoken with. The Americans developed the capacity to put miniaturised nuclear bombs on short-range rockets, artillery and tank shells in the 1950s – something Pakistan is apparently doing now and very successfully.

"The most significant development in recent years has been the creation of a battlefield nuclear force 'in being' that provides Pakistan the option of a battlefield use of nuclear weapons," writes Christopher Clary in an essay on Pakistani nukes published by the US National Bureau of Asian Research.

Western officials say the dangers of such weapons are many. They are made in large numbers and are small and thus can more easily be stolen or hijacked by extremist groups operating openly in Pakistan; smaller nuclear weapons make it easier to decide to wage a limited nuclear war if Islamabad considers it is being defeated in a conflict with India's much larger conventional armed forces; and such weapons can be specifically targeted on, say, invading Indian military formations, raising the ante for an all-out nuclear war.

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no first use" of nuclear weapons in its strategic focus and therefore every crisis the two countries have been involved in since they became nuclear weapon states has forced Islamabad to adopt a threatening and risky posture in order to avoid total war with India, which it would surely lose. "Small nuclear weapons make it psychologically easier for decision makers to use them, rather than having to decide about an all-out nuclear war," says one western expert.

Pakistani officials point out several elements in their favour. Despite attacks on airports, military bases and other sensitive places, terrorists have never stolen or been able to acquire nuclear materials – although there is always a first time.

There is the equally threatening posture of Indian forces who have developed a battlefield plan called 'Cold Start', which takes advantage of their much larger conventional forces to inflict a quick defeat on specific Pakistani forces or border regions before Islamabad can fully mobilise.

The Pakistan Army which has to defend a very long border with India, and does not have the forces or reserves to do so adequately, fears exactly such a strategy. India denies that it even has a 'Cold Start' strategy which makes discussions between the two countries even more difficult.

The real concern for western powers at the moment is not that two rational governments will go to war, but that the proxy wars they wage against each other will get out of hand. Terrorist groups who have been sponsored by the Pakistani military in the past and are not under any control now could create a war syndrome on the border, just as the 2008 suicide attack in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba did when 166 Indians were killed. Likewise, India is needling Pakistan by allegedly backing separatists in Balochistan.

In recent weeks, scares generated by terrorist attacks either on Indian forces in the disputed region of Kashmir or on civilian targets in both countries have led to several acute rises in tensions.

It is still difficult to convince the Pakistani army that the real threat comes not from India, but from the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorist groups active on its soil. The army also faces questions from a public that by and large supports the nuclear programme, but wonders why Pakistan needs such a large nuclear arsenal when it already has a viable



nuclear deterrent against India and why so much is still being spent on making new bombs when the economy is in melt down. So far there has been no adequate answer.

Both India and Pakistan spend an extraordinary amount of money on their nuclear weapons programmes that are expanding and growing all the time at a huge cost to their respective populations who remain largely mired in poverty.

Pakistan's larger nuclear arsenal and development of tactical bombs and India's huge rocket development programme for carrying nuclear weapons has only fuelled a new arms race in the region that now involves not just the size of bombs, but also delivery vehicles.

Both countries may not like or trust one another but increasingly their nuclear weapons programmes are totally out of sync with economic and other realities on the ground. But who will say this to them when there is no international or regional diplomatic effort in place which could hold talks between the two sides and try and stem this hugely dangerous game? The west's concerns about Pakistan's miniaturised nuclear bombs should be translated into a larger deal that pushes both Islamabad and New Delhi to contain what is now a runaway bomb by making by two countries who have proved three times that they can go to war against one another.

Ahmed Rashid is best-selling author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, most recently 'Descent into Chaos'. This article was also carried by The Financial Times.

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/10/23/comment/beware-pakistans-small-nuclear-weapons/

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Albuquerque Journal – Albuquerque, NM OPINION/Editorial

Editorial: Science, Not Semantics, must Drive Nuke Update

By Albuquerque Journal Editorial Board October 24, 2013

According to a recent CNN report, Russia has an estimated 8,420 nuclear warheads; the United Kingdom, 225; France, 300; China, 240; Pakistan, 90 to 110; India, 80 to 100; Israel, 80; North Korea, fewer than 10. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the institution charged with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, has uncovered evidence of covert nuclear activities in Iran and Syria.

The United States is on good terms with some of those countries, others not so much.

So even entertaining the idea America should not update its nuclear stockpile of 7,650 warheads – all decades old – because "it sends the wrong message to the rest of the world" is a dangerous exercise in futility. Even if that advice comes from the man who ran the country's nuclear testing program in Nevada.

Philip Coyle's impressive résumé also includes the title deputy director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He said recently that the Energy Department's \$60 billion plan to modernize the nation's arsenal by mixing old and newly manufactured parts from seven existing weapons designs violates the Obama administration's pledge against developing new nuclear weapons.

That warning would carry more weight if Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad cared about such pledges, if Vladamir Putin and Xi Jinping had the same goals as Barack Obama.

Concerns that the current DOE plan results in untested combinations of parts that put reliability and safety into question must be addressed, as well as the underlying problem of insufficient routine testing and surveillance to assure full reliability of the weapons.

It is vital for national security that realism and pragmatism rule the day, and science rather than semantics determines the most responsible manner in which to update America's aging nuclear arsenal.



This editorial first appeared in the Albuquerque Journal. It was written by members of the editorial board and is unsigned as it represents the opinion of the newspaper rather than the writers.

http://www.abgjournal.com/287427/opinion/science-not-semantics-must-drive-nuke-update.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Times Record News – Wichita Falls, TX OPINION/Editorial

Editorial: U.S. Missile Bases Have Unacceptable Lapses

By Dale McFeatters, Scripps Howard News Service October 25, 2013

In the Cold War years of the 1950s and '60s and even into the '70s, America's nuclear arsenal -- its size, deployment, the aircraft and rockets that would deliver it and the Air Force officers and crews who oversaw it -- were front and center in the U.S. defense posture.

But there was a solid consensus among the major nations against the use of nuclear weapons for anything but self-defense. Successive presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower on rejected any suggestions that nuclear weapons be used in South and North Vietnam.

Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, maintained their arsenals as a matter of mutual deterrence, but the thawing of the Cold War led to a series of treaties placing limits on testing and the size of the arsenals.

Briefly, the peace activists' dream of a world free of nuclear weapons did not seem a total stretch. But the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, which have fought four wars and often seem just minutes from a fifth; a bellicose North Korea constantly threatening their neighbors; Iran's on-again, off-again pursuit of nuclear weapons; and Islamic terrorists' determination to get obtain a weapon of mass destruction mean the U.S. must maintain its arsenal to a high standard of readiness.

The Associated Press has detailed two instances this year when Air Force launch officers failed to secure blast doors intended to keep terrorists and intruders from gaining access to the missile bases' underground command posts.

For security reasons and to avoid embarrassment and awkward questions, mishaps and errors at missile bases and nuclear facilities rarely become public. One did in 2007, when six armed nuclear cruise missiles were inadvertently loaded aboard a B-52 and flown from North Dakota to Louisiana. The mistake was not discovered for 36 hours.

As in the case of the blast doors, the Air Force quickly punished the responsible officers, but that does not address the broader issue. As the AP put it, "The problems, including low morale, underscore the challenges of keeping safe such a deadly force that is constantly on alert but unlikely ever to be used."

Inescapably, however, these are problems that must be faced. Unceasing vigilance in this case is more than just a platitude; it's a vital element of our defense against an enemy that sees martyrdom as not only a tactic but a desirable goal.

http://www.timesrecordnews.com/news/2013/oct/25/editorial-us-missile-bases-have-unacceptable/
(Return to Articles and Documents List)